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Abstract:
In this paper, I bring forth a proposal on how to proceed with the Climate Negotiations after
the meager results of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in December 2009 in
Copenhagen. I argue that splitting continued negotiations into two separate blocks could both save
time and make it more likely to ultimately reach a comprehensive treaty in Mexico City in December
2010. The first block would deal with historical emissions of greenhouse gases including a
mutual debt cancellation: developed countries carbon debts vs. developing countries conventional
monetary debts. The second block would deal with future emissions and how to finance adaption
to climate change. Following the polluter pays –principle, I argue that the funds should be collected
in proportion to the responsibility for proceeding climate change and redistributed in proportion
to the needs for adaption.
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Introduction 
In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the global body responsible for scientific assessment of 
climate change, and Al Gore, the panel’s most renowned campaigner. With this 
decision, the Norwegian Nobel Committee highlighted the link between the risk of 
accelerating climate change and the risk of violent conflict and wars (Smith, 
2007). Climate change was also among the justifications for awarding the same 
prize to US President Barack Obama two years later (Smith, 2009). In his Nobel 
lecture, President Obama stated that the world must come together to confront 
climate change: “There is little scientific dispute that if we do nothing, we will face 
more drought, more famine, more mass displacement – all of which will fuel more 
conflict for decades” (Obama, 2009a). 
The election of Barack Obama as the President of the United States had raised 
high hopes for a comprehensive new climate treaty to succeed the Kyoto 
Protocol expiring in 2012. This hope was reinforced in July, 2009 at the G8 Summit in 
L’Aquila where the G8 leaders, including President Obama, recognized the 
scientific view on the need to keep global temperature rise below two degrees 
Celsius above preindustrial levels (G8 Leaders Declaration, 2009).  
A strong commitment by the United States would remove the major excuse for 
China not to move ahead. China´s President Hu Jintao had recently reaffirmed 
that they will not commit to mandatory emissions-reduction targets before the 
world's wealthy countries take the lead in addressing global climate change. The 
stakes were raised in mid September 2009, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that 
Russia would reject any new climate change agreement that imposed restrictions 
on Russia but not bind other big polluters (McBride, 2009). 
The UN summit on climate change in New York on September 22, 2009 did not 
provide the much hoped breakthrough; neither President Hu Jintao (2009) or 
President Barack Obama (2009b) provided any binding commitments to emission 
reductions in their much awaited speeches. The outcome of the Bangkok 
negotiations in the beginning of October was also disappointingly meager. The 
negotiators managed to cut the draft text roughly in half, but they could not move 
forward on the most significant issues such as finance commitments and emission 
reduction targets.  
All of the major questions remained unadressed when the UN Climate Change 
Conference (COP15) started in Copenhagen on December 7, 2009. Unrealistic or 
not, there were still high hopes for the culmination of a two-year intensive 
negotiating process with a comprehensive and legally binding treaty. Otherwise, 
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more than 40,000 people would hardly have applied for accreditation at the 
conference, while up to 100,000 took part in a mass demonstration in the streets of 
Copenhagen in support of strong action against climate change. The 
expectations were soon lowered, as much of the first week was mostly used to 
negotiate about how to negotiate. No treaty was in sight when the second 
segment started at the end of the second week with close to 115 world leaders 
attending.  
In the end, what we got out of the conference was a loosely formulated three 
page long unofficial document – the Copenhagen Accord (2009) – hammered 
out between a few large countries during the last night. Compared to the 
expectations at the beginning of the conference this leaflet was a 
disappointment. However, it can be argued that it was the best that could be 
achieved. It did include a 2°C target, and even a reference to the possibility of 
limiting temperature increase to below 1.5°C advocated by Small Island 
Developing States fearing drowning. However, we did not get a new international 
agreement on climate change with legally binding emission reduction targets to 
follow the Kyoto Protocol.  
One of the major reasons for the meager results of the Copenhagen conference is 
that it tried to solve several questions simultaneously, severely limiting resolutions 
and solutions. In concordance with this argument, my proposal on how to 
proceed with climate negotiations splits the negotiation process into separate 
blocks. I argue that splitting continued negotiations into two separate blocks could 
both save time, and make it more likely to ultimately reach an all inclusive 
comprehensive climate treaty. The first block would deal with historical emissions 
including a mutual debt cancellation, and the second block would deal with 
present and future emissions, and how to finance the adaption to the 
consequences of these emissions. 
Historical emissions 
Developing countries are righteously pointing to the main reason for a warming 
climate: historical greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries. Settling this 
carbon debt of the developed world would take away excuses for developing 
countries not to participate in a climate treaty.  
According to an estimate made by Simms, Robins and Meyer (1999), G7-countries 
are running up carbon debts in economic efficiency terms of around $13 trillion 
each year, while the group of highly indebted poor countries is running up credits 
of $141 to $612 billion. This debt is calculated by how much of the G7-countries’ 
gross domestic product is produced through the use of fossil fuels in excess of an 
equitable global per capita allotment of carbon emissions. 
A more modest estimate of the carbon debt is presented by Raina (2002). With a 
price tag between ten and twenty U.S. dollars per tonnes of excess emissions, he 
proposes a G7 yearly carbon debt between $15 and $30 billion a year, and for all 
Northern industrial countries between $30 and $60 billion. Most recently 
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Ragueneau (2009) estimated that the carbon debt of industrialized countries 
accumulated since the beginning of the fossil fuel driven industrial revolution 
equals the total external debt of developing countries ($ 2,860 billion vs. $ 2,850 
billion). 
It can though be argued that developed countries have no moral responsibility for 
greenhouse gas emissions before climate change was considered a problem 
(Vanderheiden, 2008). But then we stumble into the question of what date should 
be the appropriate cut-off point. Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius (1859-1927) is 
often mentioned as the first one who warned about global warming as a 
consequence of increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. 
Arrhenius (1896) calculated that a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere would 
increase global surface temperature by an average of five to six Celsius degrees. 
He did not, however, consider this a problem. On the contrary, Arrhenius (1908) 
looked forward to better climates and abundant crops to the benefit of rapidly 
propagating mankind. So this could hardly be the appropriate cut off point.  
To the author knowledge Canadian physicist Gilbert Plass (1956a) was the first 
scientist to warn that a warming climate could be something to worry about. In a 
series of articles published in 1956, he estimated that if the carbon dioxide content 
of the atmosphere doubles, the surface temperature will rise by 3.6 Celsius 
degrees. Contrary to his predecessors, Plass (1956b) regarded this as a problem 
arguing that “the temperature from this cause may be so large in several centuries 
that it will present a serious problem to future generations”. Next year Roger 
Revelle and Hans E. Suess (1957) hardened the tone of the warning, stating that 
the present rate of combustion of fossil fuels presents “a large scale geophysical 
experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be 
reproduced in the future.” 
The publication of the so called Keeling-curve in 1960 might be a more 
appropriate cut-off point, as it was the first measured evidence for rising levels of 
carbon dioxide. Another possible cut-off point could be in 1979, when the first 
World Climate Conference appealed to the nations of the world “to foresee and 
to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the 
well-being of humanity”. Yet another could be 1990, when the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change stated in its First Assessment Report that the threat of 
climate change was real, and a global treaty was needed to deal with it (IPCC, 
2004). Vanderheiden (2008) proposes the latest one as the most defensible starting 
point arguing that: “By then, most national governments were fully aware of the 
likely effects of various kinds of human activity on global climate and could have 
initiated emission abatement programs…”(p. 190). 
Can ignorance be a defendable reason for the lack of moral responsibility? 
Modifying the polluter-pays principle, Shue (1999) claims that “if whoever makes a 
mess receives the benefits and does not pay the costs, not only does he have no 
incentive to avoid making as many messes as he likes, but he is also unfair to 
whoever does pay the costs” (p. 535). 
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We could also consider developed countries use of fossil fuels in excess of an 
equitable global per capita allotment of carbon emissions as a conventional loan. 
A loan that has financed the carbon led growth of developed countries since the 
industrial revolution. If developed countries default on this loan, why should 
developing countries have any responsibility for paying their loans either? 
This mutual indebtedness, developed countries carbon debts vs. developing 
countries conventional monetary debts, provides an opportunity to settle the 
scores, and start from a clean table. Considering this mutual debt, developing 
countries joining a global climate treaty should get their debt cancelled. As a 
bonus, cancelling the debts would help to restore the crumbling banking system 
by cleaning the assets from unserviceable loans. 
A fair emission quota 
Mutual debt annulations would clean the table for negotiations about how to 
cope with future emissions. This can be split into two separate blocks. In the first 
block a sustainable emission level and a fair distribution of it has to be defined, 
and in the second block what to do with emissions above this sustainable level 
must be established. A sustainable emission level can be defined as an emission 
level that would not cause any further climate warming. I leave it to climate 
scientist to define the exact level, as the purpose of this article is only to provide a 
suggestion for a general framework for continuing climate negotiations. 
Intuitively it sounds clear that the sustainable emissions level has to be divided 
equally among all humans. Following a Rawlsian approach, we might argue that a 
different division would be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 
1971, Kunnas 2009). An overdraft, at least for a transition period could perhaps be 
justifiable, if countries emitting over their fair quota would pay for their excess 
emissions. By selling emission quotas to countries needing additional quotas, 
countries emitting greenhouse gases below their quota of the sustainable 
emissions could raise money to be used to finance vital investments in human 
capital and infrastructure, like schooling, health care or clean water. One way of 
collecting these funds is explained below. 
Towards a sustainable emission level 
The last block dealing with emissions above sustainable levels starts by a decision 
of an emission path from present emission levels to the sustainable level. The 
gentler the slope the longer it would take to reach the sustainable emission level 
and the more additional warming we commit the planet to.  
The projected distribution of economic impacts of climate change is such that it 
would increase the disparity in well-being between developed countries and 
developing countries, with disparity growing for higher projected temperature 
increases. The highest human costs will be borne by the poorest, as they have less 
capacity to adapt, and are more vulnerable to climate change damage. Even in 
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regions with higher adaptive capacity, such as North America, Australia, New 
Zealand and the Nordic Countries there are vulnerable communities, such as 
indigenous peoples (IPCC, 2007; Arctic Climate Assessment, 2007). 
Thus, we need to accompany the design of an emission path towards sustainable 
emission, with a system to collect funds for the needs of adaption to the adverse 
impacts from climate change. Following the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the funds 
should be collected in proportion to the responsibility for proceeding climate 
change and redistributed in proportion to the needs for adaption. The total 
amount of funds needed depends on the additional warming and adaption costs 
the chosen emission path would lead to. The payment for each unit of greenhouse 
gases emitted can be calculated by dividing the best available estimate of the 
total adaptation fund needed by the total emissions above the sustainable level 
under the chosen emission path.  
Countries that consider their payments to the damage fund as too large, can 
strive for a deeper and faster emission reduction path decreasing both total global 
emissions, and their respective share of emissions.  
The effectiveness of the system could be enhanced if the funds collected for 
adaptation needs in the long-run were invested in the development of climate 
friendly energy technology in the short-run. By making new energy technology 
available, it would also make reaching the emission goals cheaper thus lowering 
the threshold for lower emission targets.  
Conclusions 
This paper proposed a two-step approach for climate negotiations. Splitting 
continued negotiations into two separate blocks could save time, and make the 
world more likely to reach an all inclusive comprehensive climate treaty. The first 
block would deal with historical emissions including a mutual debt cancellation, 
while the second would deal with future emissions and how to finance adaption to 
climate change. 
Considering the mutual indebtedness, developed countries carbon debts vs. 
developing countries conventional monetary debts, developing countries joining a 
global climate treaty should get their external debts cancelled. Such debt 
settlement would be a strong motivation for developing countries to join a climate 
treaty, and would also take away their strongest excuse not to participate in a 
climate treaty; their righteous appeal that the main reason for climate change is 
the historical greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries.  
Finally, we need an agreement of an emission path from present emission levels to 
sustainable levels. The gentler the slope, the more additional warming we commit 
the planet to. The highest human costs of this will be borne by the poorest, as they 
have less capacity to adapt and are more vulnerable to climate change. Thus, we 
need a system to collect funds for the needs of adaption to the adverse impacts 
from climate change. The funds should be collected in proportion to the 
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responsibility for proceeding climate change, and redistributed in proportion to the 
needs for adaption. 
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